Ray of Offense

In 2007, the Tampa Bay Rays finished last, 30 games under .500. In 2008, they won the AL pennant. In 2009, they went 84-78 and missed the playoffs.
How much variance was there in their offense to explain those? Let’s look first at the raw numbers of how the team’s offense performed, compared to the league average:

Tm R/G 6 HR SB CS BB SO BA OBP SLG GDP
TBD 4.83 187 131 48 545 1324 0.268 0.336 0.433 119
2007 4.90 161 97 35 536 1053 0.271 0.338 0.423 137
TBR 4.78 180 142 50 626 1224 0.260 0.340 0.422 111
2008 4.78 162 94 35 537 1060 0.268 0.336 0.420 136
TBR 4.96 199 194 61 642 1229 0.263 0.343 0.439 104
2009 4.82 183 110 39 550 1094 0.267 0.336 0.428 130

Then, each season’s numbers translated into the 2009 context, for uniformity of context:

R/G 6 HR SB CS BB SO BA OBP SLG GDP
2007 4.75 213 149 53 559 1376 0.264 0.334 0.438 113
2008 4.82 203 166 56 641 1263 0.259 0.340 0.430 106
2009 4.96 199 194 61 642 1229 0.263 0.343 0.439 104

As you can see, the offensive context has fluctuated, but when you adjust for the league, Tampa’s offense has shown gradual, year-on-year improvement, albeit not dramatic improvement, with the offense becoming incrementally more patient, more successful making contact, and less dependent upon the home run ball. But clearly, the major variable over the past three seasons has been the pitching and defense, not the offense.

One thought on “Ray of Offense”

  1. While it was a total team effort that took them out of the play-offs in 2009 the offense (along with the miserable bullpen) would have to have some accountability. In the 48-41 first-half TB was
    .271/.353/.453
    before devolving into a 36-37 second half of
    .252/.330/.422
    What stood out to me was that in the first half they stole 133 bases while being thrown out only 30 times (a pretty phenomenal 81.6 success rate). In the second half they stole 61 bases while being thrown out 31 times (a less than acceptable 66.3 success rate). Seems there has to be some correlation with running into more outs, having less guys on second base and, in general, posing less of a running threat that lead to a far lower run total.

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